
IP Australia's rewritten examination guidance for software patents repeats the headline propositions of the Aristocrat decisions, then rebuilds the tests Aristocrat rejected. This does examiners and applicants no favours. Applicants should expect objections based upon the Manual's posture but answer them from the law. While examination should be to the standard of the prevailing law, the Manual plays a pivotal role informing examination practice, and Patent Office hearing decisions as well.
Examination of Australian patent applications at IP Australia is guided by the Patent Manual of Practice and Procedure (PMPP). The PMPP covers amongst many topics the patent eligibility of computer-implemented inventions, specifically at section 5.6.8.6 of the PMPP. This section has been successively updated since Aristocrat, and the latest update for the foreseeable future was published 3 July 2026. The PMPP states the headline propositions of the Aristocrat decisions and then rebuilds the tests based upon earlier decisions Aristocrat displaced. Applicants with software and other computer-implemented claims can expect similar patent eligibility objections as before, and should answer them from the case law.
The Full Federal Court refused certain software patent claims for more than a decade based upon reasoning that has now been set aside by Aristocrat. The line of decisions began with Grant in 2006. The next major decision was Research Affiliates. This decision drew on the US Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corporation Pty Ltd v CLS Bank International 573 US 208 (2014) for the idea that the computer itself must be improved (refer Encompass at [40], [104]–[106]). RPL Central hardened that idea in 2015 into a rule that the invention must lie in the computerisation. The implication is that software would really only be patentable if there was a demonstrable hardware innovation accompanying the software innovation. Generic hardware would not suffice. This represented a quite restrictive approach to patent eligibility for software that many believed unreasonably carved out software innovation from the patent system. The question the courts were grappling with was how do you distinguish an abstract idea from its expression as a patentable invention.
The Commissioner was a party to every one of these cases except Encompass, a private infringement action, and appeared in that one too (Encompass at [65], [70]–[71]). Three times a single judge found for the applicant, in RPL Central, Rokt and Aristocrat. And three times the Commissioner appealed and won. In two of those cases the applicant then sought special leave from the High Court and was refused. The table begins with Grant in 2006, the business-method case on which the software decisions built. So there has been a history of 20 years in the making, and the law which developed around these cases is now displaced. Yet IP Australia's examination guidelines have stayed reverted to displaced reasoning.
The High Court's refusal of special leave in February 2026 settled the question. IP Australia has since rewritten section 5.6.8.6 across two substantive revisions: on 16 March 2026, and again on 3 July 2026 following public consultation. It received 11 submissions. The published ones come from Spruson & Ferguson, FPA Patent Attorneys, AIPPI Australia, FICPI Australia and the Computer Implemented Inventions Task Force, along with this firms. The existing published guidelines from 3 July 2026 are not obviously informed by any of the published consultation submissions.
The High Court described the Full Court's decision as an application of "established principles". IP Australia's response to the consultation does not use that phrase. It says instead that "computer implemented inventions require unique consideration", and it declined to change the Manual on that point. The allowing reasons, which the Full Court adopted, say the opposite (at [152]–[153]).
Aristocrat settles the law on patent eligibility for computer-implemented inventions. Aristocrat refers here to three of the interconnected decisions tabulated above: Aristocrat 2022, Aristocrat 2025, and Aristocrat 2026. In August 2022 the High Court split three to three in Aristocrat. In September 2025 the Full Federal Court adopted the reasons of Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ, the "allowing reasons" (at [125]).
In February 2026 seven Justices refused the Commissioner special leave in Aristcrat 2026. This decision is extraordinarily brief, but significant: the High Court Justices endorsed the Full Court as having "applied established principles concerning the assessment of manner of manufacture" and reaching "a unanimous and clear conclusion as to characterisation".
Read together, the Aristocrat decisions stand for six propositions:
The updated section repeats several of these propositions in its own words:
All these statements are consistent with the current law of Aristocrat. Examination practice would have to change if the section took these premise to their conclusion. The Manual does not however stop there.
Instead of reflecting the "one question" nature of the enquiry on patent eligibility, the PMPP sets forth a "decision-making framework" built from the reasoning in decisions Aristocrat explicity set aside. Five points of divergence matter most.
Two of these have an identifiable source, and neither is the law. The hardware question follows the three Justices who would have dismissed Aristocrat's appeal (at [73] and [77]–[78] of their reasons). The technical questions follow Nicholas J's 2021 minority decision (at [117]). The Full Court adopted neither.
The framework's shape is also familiar. It asks whether the claim runs on a known computer and, if so, whether the computer is improved. That is close to the two-step approach that all six High Court Justices criticised in 2022 (Full Court at [50], [116]).
This is the main error in the PMPP. The two-limb formulation categories the displaced authorities in distinct categories: (i) an abstract idea manipulated on a computer (unpatentable); and {ii) an abstract idea implemented on a computer to produce an artificial state of affairs and a useful result (patentable). The catgories are somewhat self-defining as there is no inherent difference between manipulated vs implemented.
The problem is PMPP promotes the two-limb formulation to an exact formula for deciding upon patentability. A more careful reading of Aristocrat indicates that it was never framed as a test. Rather, the two-limb formulation is offered as a framing that reinterprets the conclusions of the displaced authorities. The two-limb formulation is "a better way of expressing the point in such cases" (allowing reasons at [122]; Full Court at [131]). The cases were the earlier ones whose results were "plainly correct" and whose reasoning was not. The formulation replaced the phrase "improvement in computer technology", which the Full Court traced through Rokt back to RPL Central at [96] (at [130]).
The only support the Full Court gave it is that it fits the results of those decided cases (at [132]–[133]).
When the Full Court decided Aristocrat's own claims, it did so by characterisation and the language of NRDC. It would have found claim 1 eligible "for the reasons given in the allowing reasons" (at [135]). It held the remaining claims eligible because each was an altered gaming machine producing "an artificial state of affairs and a useful result" (at [136]). Only after that did it add that the claims were "as described in alternative (ii)", and it explained the label in NRDC's own words (at [141]). Its stated grounds were analogy with claim 1 and characterisation of the claims (at [142]).
That matters because NRDC rejected attempts to place on manner of manufacture "the fetters of an exact verbal formula" (Full Court at [128]). Read as a test, the formulation adds nothing to NRDC. "Manipulated" and "implemented" name the two possible results without saying how to reach either.
An examiner who follows the PMPP section 5.6.8.6 step-by-step will inevitably reject many cases that are allowable under Aristocrat. The saving grace is that it is likely that same cases may be allowed despite examination guidelines by virtue of appeal to the law of Aristocrat. Almost every software claim runs on standard hardware, and the section sends each of those claims to its factors. The factors ask the questions of the past decade: is the computer improved, is there a technical effect, is a technical problem solved.
The worked cases reinforce the habit. Each of the six refused examples ends with the same line: "There were no factors supporting the existence of patentable subject matter". Factors described as optional become decisive once they are the only route left.
The first Patent Office decision to apply the new approach shows the pattern. In CQMS Pty Ltd v Joy Global Surface Mining Inc [2026] APO 19, decided on 18 August 2026, the delegate worked through the Manual's sequence (at [294]). A claim using a generic processor was refused. A near-identical claim was allowed because its wear sensor was not shown to be common general knowledge (at [319], [322]).
That is an outcome the Manual explains and Aristocrat does not. The gaming machine in Aristocrat had no new hardware at all.
Expect the objection the Manual produces, and answer it from the judgments.
None of this makes every software claim eligible. While passing comment, Aristocrat expressed the (unsubstantiated) view that that former authorities concerned applications in which the conclusions were "plainly correct" in the words of the allowing reasons (at [121]–[122], echoed [132] of Aristocrat 2025). The argument is about the route an examiner must take, and on many claims the route decides the result.
The Manual is guidance for examiners. It is not the law. Examiners, delegates and courts apply the Patents Act as the courts have construed it, and where the Manual and the law differ, examination should follow the law.